Megaport is a company that provides the plumbing for the internet and cloud computing, but made simple and easy to use. Over the past 14 years it has built a large, software-controlled network that connects businesses to cloud services in more than 1,100 data centres across 30+ countries. More recently, Megaport bought a company called Latitude that lets customers quickly spin up computing power (CPUs and GPUs) and storage in those same locations through an online portal.
What the company offers today
Fast, on-demand access to compute (CPUs and GPUs), storage, and high-speed networking delivered through software. Customers can provision servers in seconds.
A global footprint of data centres and existing contracts, so Megaport can place equipment in many locations quickly instead of building new giant data centres.
An integrated product: network plus compute plus storage all automated and managed from one platform.
Why AI matters to Megaport
New AI tools (large language models, coding assistants, and “agents” that automate tasks) are creating huge demand for two things: fast computers called GPUs, and lots of supporting CPU and network capacity.
There are two kinds of AI work. Training big models requires massive, power-hungry data centres. Inference, which is running models to serve users, can be spread across many locations. Inference suits Megaport’s distributed setup.
Many companies cannot get GPUs quickly from big cloud providers because supply is tight. That creates strong demand for the kind of on-demand GPU capacity Megaport can provide.
Recent wins and what they mean
Megaport has announced several large contracts totalling hundreds of millions of dollars and is raising capital to deliver those contracts and build an on-demand GPU pool.
The company already runs thousands of CPUs and GPUs via Latitude. The planned GPU pool will let customers rent GPU capacity by the hour or month, giving quick access without long waits.
These contracts and the GPU pool act like a “shock absorber”. Customers can scale quickly when they need extra capacity while Megaport procures and deploys longer-term capacity.
The opportunity ahead
Short term: meet urgent customer demand for GPUs and compute that big cloud providers cannot satisfy fast enough.
Medium term: attract new customers using on-demand access, then convert some to longer contracts while cross-selling networking and storage.
Long term: support enterprises running private or regulated AI systems by offering secure, geographically distributed compute plus the network to connect it.
In short, Megaport has combined a huge global network with easy-to-use compute and storage tools. With strong AI-driven demand and recent large contracts, it is well positioned to help companies deploy and scale AI applications quickly.
The company is on track to annualise $660m of ARR and is growing very fast. At a valuation of $3B we think the upside is significant. Megaport offers one of the better AI exposures on the ASX. With reported rumours of the upcoming listings of Firmus and others, we prefer an established player, with a track record of execution, profitability and a reasonable valuation.
The risks investors should think about
A thesis like this would not be honest without acknowledging where it could go wrong.
The first risk is the capital raise itself. The $827m entitlement offer is priced at $14.30, a 13.9% discount to the last close. Shareholders who do not participate will be diluted, and existing investors are absorbing a meaningful equity issuance to fund a deployment that has not yet been earned out on the income statement. The raise is fully underwritten, which removes execution risk on the funding side, but it does not remove the dilution.
The second risk is utilisation. The $350m GPU Pool is the speculative part of the strategy. Unlike the four contracted deals, the GPU Pool is capacity that Megaport is deploying before customer demand is locked in. If on-demand demand falls short of expectations, the company carries the utilisation risk directly. That is a different kind of exposure to a contracted revenue stream and the market will watch utilisation metrics closely over the next 12 to 18 months.
The third risk is capex intensity. Building out high performance NVIDIA GPU infrastructure is not cheap, and Megaport has committed approximately $369.5m of capex to service the new contracts on top of the GPU Pool investment. The historical Megaport investment case has been about an asset-light, software-defined network platform. The new model is more capital intensive, and that has implications for return on invested capital that investors should be comfortable with before assuming the same multiple applies to the new business.
The fourth risk is competition. Hyperscalers like AWS, Azure and Google Cloud are not standing still. If they resolve their GPU supply constraints faster than expected, or if they aggressively compete on price and distribution for inference workloads, the window Megaport is moving into could narrow. Specialised AI infrastructure providers like CoreWeave, Lambda Labs and others are also targeting the same enterprise customers.
The fifth risk is the broader AI cycle. The bull case for Megaport assumes that AI inference demand continues to scale rapidly and that enterprises continue to need distributed, low latency infrastructure to deploy AI in production. If the AI capex cycle slows, or if inference workloads consolidate into a smaller number of hyperscale locations rather than spreading geographically, the demand profile changes.
None of these risks invalidate the thesis. They are the risks that need to be priced into the position size and the time horizon.
TAMIM Takeaway
The market has been searching for the right way to express AI exposure on the ASX for the last 18 months. Most of the obvious candidates are either expensive (NXT), early stage and speculative (the upcoming Firmus IPO and similar names), or only loosely connected to the AI capex cycle.
Megaport offers something different. An established business with a track record of execution. A profitable core network division that is now growing 25 per cent year on year. A clear and credible path into AI infrastructure through Latitude and the GPU Pool. Pro forma group ARR tracking toward $660m. A capital raise that funds real, contracted customer demand rather than a hopeful expansion into a new market. And a valuation that, while no longer cheap, has not yet priced in the full optionality of the global inference cloud opportunity.
For long term investors looking for AI exposure on the ASX, the practical question is not whether Megaport is the cheapest way to play the theme. It is whether it is the best risk-adjusted way. We think the combination of an existing network business, a credible AI strategy, an experienced management team, and a reasonable valuation makes it one of the more compelling AI exposures available on the local market today. The risks are real and the execution bar is high, but the setup is one of the better ones we have seen.
This week’s reading list reflects a market environment increasingly shaped by the intersection of technology, capital, geopolitics, and changing investor expectations. From the rapid rise of AI-driven businesses and next-generation IPOs to renewed inflation pressures and shifting market sentiment, the common thread is the growing complexity behind where capital flows and why. Investors are being challenged to balance optimism around innovation with the realities of higher costs, geopolitical tension, and uneven market reactions. At the same time, developments in private equity and property markets highlight how long-term themes such as consumer resilience, housing demand, and strategic capital allocation continue to evolve beneath the headlines. Questions around leadership, governance, and control within the AI industry also reinforce that technological disruption is becoming as much a human and institutional story as it is a technical one. Across markets and industries, adaptability and disciplined thinking remain essential as narratives shift faster than fundamentals. In that context, this week’s selection offers insight into how investors and businesses are positioning for a future defined by both opportunity and uncertainty.
There is a particular pleasure in finding businesses the market has decided are finished telling interesting stories. The narrative has moved on. The growth chapter is closed. The conference circuit has lost interest. And somewhere in that silence, the cash flows keep arriving.
Three companies currently sit in that category, in three different parts of the world, doing three quite different things. ORIX in Japan. eBay in the United States. Adobe, also in the United States, though increasingly a global software story rather than an American one. None of them is fashionable. All of them are profitable. Each is priced as if the best is behind them, which is exactly the kind of assumption that tends to age poorly.
This is not a thematic piece about a single bottleneck or a structural tailwind. It is a piece about how markets routinely confuse a quiet share price with a quiet business, and how disciplined global investors can use that confusion.
The market loves a story, until it doesn’t
Equity markets reward narrative. When the narrative is intact, multiples expand and forgiveness flows freely. When the narrative pauses, even briefly, the same investors who paid up for the story tend to leave with surprising speed.
The result is that perfectly good businesses get re-rated downwards not because the cash flows have deteriorated, but because the story has become harder to tell at a cocktail party. This is not a new observation, but it is a recurring one, and it tends to produce a familiar opportunity set, durable businesses, sensible balance sheets, reasonable returns on capital, all trading at multiples that imply something close to permanent stagnation.
ORIX, eBay and Adobe each sit somewhere on that spectrum.
ORIX, the Japanese conglomerate that does not fit any model
ORIX is genuinely difficult to categorise, which is part of the problem and part of the opportunity. It is a financial services company, a leasing company, a private equity investor, an insurer, a real estate operator, an energy infrastructure participant, and a manager of other people’s capital. In the global investment industry, which prefers companies it can pigeonhole, this kind of breadth is treated as a defect rather than a feature.
The numbers are quietly improving. Total revenue is forecast at ¥3.33 trillion for the year to March 2026, up almost 16 percent on the prior year. Diluted earnings per share are tracking at around ¥399, with one year EPS growth of roughly 30 percent. The shares are trading near ¥6,057 on a price to earnings multiple of around 14.8 times and a price to book of about 1.45 times. The dividend yield sits at around 2.58 percent. S&P maintains a BBB+ issuer credit rating with a stable outlook.
For a diversified Japanese financial group with a return on equity that has been re-rating higher, this is not an expensive set of numbers. It is, frankly, an unexcited set of numbers.
What the market appears to be doing is applying a traditional Japanese financial discount to a business that has spent years quietly becoming something more interesting. The asset management franchise, the offshore private equity investments, the renewable energy exposure and the concession businesses all add up to a portfolio that earns its capital across cycles rather than within one. ORIX is also unusually willing, by Japanese standards, to recycle capital. It sells assets. It buys back shares. It pays a real dividend. None of this is dramatic. All of it compounds.
The risks are honest. Japanese financials remain sensitive to global rate moves and currency volatility. The conglomerate structure means earnings quality varies by segment, and some of the private equity and real estate exposures will move with cycles rather than against them. Top down concerns about Japanese governance reform fatigue are also fair.
But at this multiple, the business does not need to surprise to the upside. It just needs to keep doing what it has been doing.
eBay, the platform everyone forgot is still profitable
eBay is a useful case study in how completely the market can lose interest in a working business. Once treated as a defining internet stock, eBay now exists in a strange commercial twilight, overshadowed by Amazon, ignored by the algorithmic crowd, and rarely mentioned in the AI conversation despite being one of the earliest and most consistent adopters of machine learning in commerce.
The financials tell a different story than the chatter. Revenue for 2025 came in at $11.1 billion, up around 8 percent. EBITDA margins sit above 25 percent, with forward estimates pushing margins above 30 percent. Forecast 2026 EPS is roughly $6.13, with 2027 around $6.76. At a share price of $114.24, this puts the forward price to earnings ratio under 19 times, or closer to the mid teens on next year’s numbers. Free cash flow remains substantial. The balance sheet is investment grade BBB+. The company pays a dividend of roughly 1.09 percent and continues to buy back shares.
What makes eBay genuinely interesting, rather than simply cheap, is the niche specialisation that the broader market has not yet fully rewarded. The collectibles category, the refurbished electronics category, the luxury authentication services, the parts and accessories business in automotive, these are not commodity ecommerce categories. They are markets where trust, authentication and verification matter, which is precisely where a long established platform with deep buyer and seller history has a real moat.
The investment in AI is not the breathless variety. eBay is using machine learning to improve listing quality, to authenticate items, to match buyers and sellers more efficiently, and to extract value from the long tail of inventory that no algorithmic competitor really wants to handle. These improvements show up in conversion rates and take rates, not in keynote announcements.
The risks are also clear. Gross merchandise volume growth remains modest. Competitive pressure in core categories has not disappeared. The company sits in a part of the market where capital allocation discipline is essential, and shareholders are right to keep watching how cash is deployed.
What the market appears to be paying for is a business that is not growing rapidly. What it appears to be ignoring is a business that converts a high share of revenue into cash, returns most of that cash to shareholders, and operates in categories where defensibility is rising rather than falling.
Adobe, when growth becomes value without warning
Adobe is perhaps the most interesting of the three, because the re-rating has been recent and sharp. The shares traded above $422 in the past 52 weeks. They now sit near $255. Nothing about the underlying business explains a move of that magnitude.
The financials remain remarkable for a company at this scale. Revenue for fiscal 2025 was $23.8 billion, up around 10.5 percent. Forecast 2026 revenue is roughly $26.1 billion. Gross margins sit close to 89 percent. EBITDA margins are pushing toward 47 percent on forward estimates. Forecast 2026 EPS is around $23.55, rising to $26.39 in 2027. At the current share price, this puts the forward price to earnings ratio at around 10.8 times.
A software company with mid double digit revenue growth, near 90 percent gross margins, an A+ credit rating, and a forward EBITDA multiple of around 8 times, is not a value trap by any normal definition. It is a quality compounder that the market has decided to treat as if its product set has been disrupted overnight.
The disruption argument runs roughly as follows. Generative AI will commoditise creative software. Newer entrants will undercut Adobe’s pricing. Customers will switch. Margins will compress.
The argument has some merit at the edges. Some commodified creative tasks will indeed move to lower priced tools or to embedded AI features in other platforms. But the argument also significantly underestimates the structural position Adobe occupies. The professional creative workflow does not begin and end with image generation. It involves project files, version control, asset libraries, brand guidelines, marketing integration, regulatory compliance, video editing, document workflows and increasingly, AI features that Adobe itself has integrated into Creative Cloud and Firefly. Enterprise customers do not rip out workflow software because a new tool can generate an interesting picture. They evaluate total cost, integration, security and continuity.
Adobe has spent decades becoming the default infrastructure of the global creative and marketing industry. That position is not undone in a quarter, nor in a year.
The risks deserve respect. Competition is real. Enterprise software pricing is under more scrutiny than at any point in the last decade. The Figma acquisition saga revealed how seriously regulators are now watching consolidation in this space. AI may genuinely compress some pricing power at the lower end of the product range.
But the multiple now offered is not pricing modest disruption. It is pricing structural decline. That is a meaningful gap between perception and reality.
The common thread
These three companies are different in almost every respect. Different geographies. Different business models. Different end markets. What they share is a market posture that assumes the future will look meaningfully worse than the present, despite very little evidence that this is the case.
For ORIX, the assumption is that the conglomerate model deserves a permanent discount.
For eBay, the assumption is that the platform is being slowly displaced and deserves to be priced as a cash flow runoff.
For Adobe, the assumption is that AI has broken the moat.
None of these assumptions is impossible. All of them require a degree of pessimism that the underlying numbers do not yet support.
This is, in my experience, the precise environment where global quality investing earns its keep. Not by chasing the most exciting narrative, but by buying durable businesses at prices that imply the absence of any future at all.
What this means for long term investors
The temptation in markets like the current one is to crowd into whichever theme is generating the loudest headlines, and to pay almost any price for participation. The discipline is to look in the opposite direction, at the companies whose stories have gone quiet but whose cash flows have not.
For long term investors, the practical question is not whether ORIX, eBay or Adobe will be on the front page tomorrow. They probably will not be. The question is whether each business, at the price now on offer, represents a sensible claim on durable future earnings.
The answer, in each case, appears to be yes. Not heroic. Not thematic. Not dramatic. Just sensible.
That, as the old global investors used to say, is generally where the money is made.
TAMIM Takeaway
Markets reward narrative, but they pay in cash flow. ORIX, eBay and Adobe each sit in that uncomfortable middle ground where the story has paused but the business has not. ORIX is a diversified Japanese financial group trading at modest multiples while quietly improving its return profile. eBay is a profitable platform operating in defensible niches that the broader market has lost interest in. Adobe is a high quality software franchise that has been re-rated as if AI has already won, even though its enterprise position remains intact.
None of these is a quick trade. All of them, for patient global investors, represent the kind of quality at a reasonable price that tends to compound while no one is paying attention. That is usually the point at which it makes the most sense to be paying attention.
Disclaimer: ORIX Corporation (TSE: 8591), eBay Inc (NASDAQ: EBAY) and Adobe Inc (NASDAQ: ADBE) are held in TAMIM portfolios as at the date of article publication. Holdings can change substantially at any time.
One of the more reliable patterns in small and mid cap investing is that the market does not always punish the part of a result that deserves to be punished. Sometimes it punishes the whole business for the misbehaviour of a small piece of it. And sometimes, in its hurry to be decisive, it marks down the higher quality part of a company at exactly the moment that part is getting better.
Gentrack Group (ASX: GTK) is, in my view, in the middle of one of those moments.
The stock peaked at around $12 in late 2024. On 5 May 2026, after the company cut its FY26 revenue and EBITDA guidance, it fell 34% in a single session. By the following day it was trading near $2.88. The half year result on 18 May confirmed the picture management had flagged: revenue down slightly, EBITDA down sharply, profit down 29%, two acquisitions announced and a buyback foreshadowed.
The market read the print, drew a line through the project revenue miss and the Kraken competitive headlines, and concluded that Gentrack was a broken growth story. From a roughly $12 peak to under $3 in eighteen months, that is the kind of share price action that usually requires a thesis-level break.
I am not convinced one has occurred. I think the market is conflating a project revenue air pocket with a recurring revenue problem, and treating a deliberate margin investment phase as if it were a margin collapse. There are risks here, and I will get to them. But the gap between the share price reaction and what the underlying business is doing looks, to me, like the kind of gap that long term investors get paid to think about clearly.
The business behind the share price
Before working through the result, it is worth setting out what Gentrack actually is, because the share price action has obscured the underlying transformation.
GTK is a specialist software and services provider to utilities and retailers in energy and water markets, with a separate airports software business called Veovo. Over the past five-plus years, this is a business that has gone from declining revenues and negative EBITDA to a growth company with roughly NZ$230m in revenue and a revenue CAGR of around 18% across that period. That is not a marginal turnaround. That is the kind of operational repositioning that usually earns a permanent re-rating.
The re-rating happened. It then unwound. The question is whether the underlying transformation has unwound with it, or whether the share price has simply travelled further than the business has.
Management remains bullish on the long term opportunity and on their ability to scale, but they have been candid about recent execution and timing setbacks. That candour matters, because the alternative, in a market like this one, is for management to overpromise on FY27 and then disappoint again. The decision to refuse FY27 guidance on the H1 call was the right one, even if it cost them a clean narrative.
What actually happened in the result
Group revenue for the half was NZ$110.1m, down 1.7% on the prior period. EBITDA excluding acquisition costs was NZ$7.9m, down from NZ$13.0m. Statutory net profit was NZ$5.1m, down from NZ$7.2m.
Those are the numbers that made the headlines. They are not the numbers that matter most.
Recurring revenue grew 12% to NZ$85.3m. The Utilities segment grew recurring revenue 9% to NZ$73.3m. The cash balance sits at NZ$73.2m with no external debt (prior to acquisitions announced). That is not the balance sheet of a company in distress.
The FY26 revenue guide of NZ$229m to NZ$238m sits below the prior implied range of around NZ$250m. The shortfall is almost entirely in non-recurring project revenue, which by definition is lumpy, lower quality and lower margin. Recurring revenue is guided to grow more than 10% for the full year to around NZ$174m.
That distinction is central here. The downgrade is not “the business is shrinking.” The downgrade is “the lower quality part of the revenue mix is smaller this year while the higher quality part is bigger.”
You can argue that a miss is a miss, and at one level you would be right. The market does not always wait for nuance. But for a long term investor trying to value a software business, the composition of revenue matters more than the headline number, because recurring revenue is what justifies a software multiple in the first place.
The first thing the market is missing: the mix is improving
If you strip Gentrack’s H1 result back to its underlying engine, recurring revenue accelerated. It now represents around 77% of group revenue, up meaningfully on the prior period. That is the direction every utility software investor wants to see.
Existing customer revenue, what most software businesses call net revenue retention, remains a major contributor. Historically a large share of half year recurring revenue has come from the installed base through upgrades, expansions and regulatory work, and that continues to be the case. The installed base is not leaking. It is being monetised more deeply.
The reason this matters is that recurring software revenue at scale is what eventually drives margin. The reason FY26 EBITDA is guided so low, between NZ$13.5m and NZ$20m excluding acquisition costs, is not that the business has lost pricing power. It is that management has chosen to keep investing in g2.0 product development, international expansion and now two bolt-on acquisitions while project revenue is in an air pocket. The implied FY26 EBITDA margin of around 6 to 8% looks bad against a market that had been modelling closer to 14%. But the gap is investment, not deterioration.
The risk, of course, is that the market starts valuing Gentrack on current earnings rather than on what those earnings could look like in 18-24 months. That is exactly what has happened. The stock now trades on roughly 18 to 19 times trailing earnings against a software sector at 38 times. That is not a software multiple. That is a “we no longer believe the recurring revenue story” multiple.
If recurring revenue continues to grow at 10% plus and EBITDA margins normalise back toward mid-teens as project revenue returns and g2.0 reduces customer onboarding costs, the FY26 print will look in hindsight like a transition cost rather than a structural break. That is the central question for long term holders, and it is a question about software unit economics, not about whether Gentrack can survive.
The second thing the market is missing: the pipeline story is more nuanced than the headlines suggest
This is where the market reaction looks most lopsided to me.
Gentrack’s near term outlook is dominated by a pipeline of roughly ten meaningful new customer opportunities across Europe and Asia Pacific, covering around 30 million meter points ($400m revenue opportunity).
Two of the most advanced “preferred” opportunities slipped during the half, and both are central to understanding what went wrong and, more importantly, what did not.
The first slipped after a paid scoping process increased the complexity and price of the deal. That is a frustrating outcome, but it is also a normal one. Paid scoping exists precisely so that both sides discover the true shape of a project before committing, and walking away from a deal that has grown out of its original economics is the correct behaviour for a software vendor that wants to protect margin. A vendor that signed everything regardless of scope would be the bigger problem.
The second slipped in the UK because of buyer ownership dynamics, specifically the Ovo and Kaluza situation, which altered the procurement outcome. When the customer’s own ownership and platform strategy is in flux, the vendor decision moves with it. That is not a Gentrack execution failure. That is the buyer’s corporate situation interrupting a process that was otherwise progressing.
Neither of these slippages reflects a lost competitive bid. Neither reflects a loss to Kraken. Neither reflects a Gentrack product or pricing problem. Both were judged by management to be largely outside their control, and based on what is publicly knowable, that judgement looks fair.
Management has shifted the expected close window for parts of the pipeline by three months and is now emphasising steadier, demonstrable progress rather than firm dated commitments. That is the right approach. The sales priority articulated on the call is straightforward: win deals, shorten sales cycles, and be the last vendor standing in competitive processes. Those are the metrics investors should be looking for over the next 9 months.
The third thing the market is missing: Kraken is a real competitor on one front, not on all of them
The competitive piece deserves to be taken seriously. Octopus Energy-owned Kraken has won Red Energy in Australia, a customer with around 600,000 customers and over 1m meter points that had been on a legacy Gentrack platform for more than a decade. It also won Meridian in New Zealand. Octopus is planning to spin Kraken out as an independent entity in mid 2026 at a reported valuation of around GBP10bn, which means Kraken has every incentive to win more deals, more aggressively, in developed markets.
Losing Red Energy is not a small thing. Pretending otherwise would be dishonest analysis. But Kraken’s natural hunting ground is large, English-speaking, deregulated energy retail markets where its parent has credibility. Gentrack’s strategic response has been to point its growth at exactly the markets where Kraken has less of a foothold and less of a structural advantage. The half year result included Utilities go-lives with Genesis Energy and ACEN Energy, and the signing of Pennon Water Services as a first major UK water utility customer. Kraken does not compete meaningfully in water, and water utility software is a deep, sticky, regulatory-heavy market that suits the Gentrack model well.
The Veovo airports business has been almost entirely ignored in the post-result commentary, and it deserves more attention. Veovo grew revenue 2.9% in the half, won NavCanada and what management described as a Tier-1 Asian airport, and expanded into Saudi Arabian airports and Melbourne. The pending acquisition of Dubai Technology Partners for NZ$17m, deepens Veovo’s Middle East footprint and adds AI-centric capability to the platform. That is not a business in retreat. Kraken does not compete in airports at all.
Capital allocation is telling you something
The Factor acquisition, closed on 15 May for NZ$24m up front with a NZ$10m earn-out tied to annual recurring revenue growth of around NZ$17m within three years, is the more strategically interesting of the two recent deals.
Gentrack did not buy Factor because it was cheap. It bought Factor because it secured a validated, fast-to-market AI pricing product and a working go-to-market motion, instead of waiting eighteen months or more to build an equivalent capability internally. Factor brings existing customers in Australia and the UK, a high-gross-margin recurring revenue model, and significant cross-sell potential into Gentrack’s installed base of more than sixty utility customers.
The intent is for Factor to function as a beachhead, accelerating market penetration while preserving clear product provenance between Factor and the g2 platform. It can be sold standalone or bundled within g2, with same day deployment and no upfront implementation project required. For a business whose biggest growth friction has been long implementation cycles, that is meaningful.
Combined with Dubai Technology Partners, Gentrack has just deployed around NZ$41m of cash, before earn-outs, on two strategic acquisitions in three weeks. The board has also announced an intention to undertake an on market buyback of up to NZ$20m, around 5% of shares on issue, over the next twelve months.
The risks worth taking seriously
A good thesis is worth more when the risks are acknowledged honestly.
The first and most uncomfortable one is the December insider sale. CEO Gary Miles sold around 752,000 shares on market at roughly NZ$9.00 in early December, which represented around 23% of his direct holding. That was about five months before a guidance reset. Insider sales are noisy signals, and there are plenty of legitimate reasons for them, but selling that quantity that close to a downgrade is the sort of thing that requires the next two or three results to be clean before the market gives management the benefit of the doubt again.
Second, the pipeline could continue to slip. Management has tried to set FY26 guidance so that it does not depend on winning deals from the new customer pipeline. That is a sensible approach after this sort of reset. But the medium term revenue target of more than 15% CAGR does depend on closing three to four of the ten or so pipeline opportunities through to March 2027. If close rates slip further, the medium term story slips with them.
Third, the FY27 picture is genuinely unclear. The CFO was asked directly about FY27 cost base and revenue trajectory on the analyst call and was, fairly, unwilling to commit. That uncertainty is part of why the stock is where it is.
Fourth, Kraken could continue to win. Two trans-Tasman wins do not make a trend, but five would. The market will be watching every major utility software contract for the next twelve months, and another high profile loss would be taken hard.
Fifth, the integration of Factor and Dubai Technology Partners has to actually work. Two acquisitions in three weeks is a lot for a business this size, and integration risk is real, particularly where the case for the deal rests on cross-sell into the existing base.
What to watch from here
Management’s stated priorities give investors a clear scorecard. The first is sales execution. Converting pipeline momentum into closed deals, ideally three to four meaningful new customer wins through to March 2027, is the single most important signal. Investors should be looking for steady, demonstrable progress rather than dated commitments.
The second is aggressive application of AI across product development, delivery automation and migration tooling, with the explicit goal of shortening implementation times and lowering project risk. If the company can compress the implementation cycle that has historically dragged on conversion, the close rate and the revenue per customer should both move in the right direction.
The third is bringing g2 and new AI-enabled capabilities, including Factor’s pricing intelligence, to the existing installed base to drive upgrades and higher wallet share. The installed base is sticky, large and underserved relative to what the platform can now do. This is the lowest risk growth lever in the business.
Disciplined post-merger integration of Factor and Dubai Technology Partners is the fourth, and any further inorganic activity should be judged against whether it materially accelerates scale and customer reach. Management has signalled that further M&A would only be pursued on that basis, which is the right discipline at this point in the cycle.
For long term investors, the question is not whether Gentrack has had a bad six months. It clearly has. The question is whether the recurring revenue engine, which is now growing at 10% plus, can keep compounding while implementation cycles shorten, the international pipeline converts at something close to the stated rate, and the cost base normalises.
If the answer is yes, then a stock trading at roughly half the software sector multiple, with no debt, a meaningful cash balance, an active buyback, two recent strategic acquisitions and a board behaving as if the price is wrong, is exactly the kind of setup small cap investors are supposed to be looking for.
If the answer is no, and the Kraken competitive pressure is the start of a broader unwinding of the customer base, then the multiple compression has further to run.
The lesson is not to be heroic. The lesson is to think clearly about which piece of the business is actually being marked down.
TAMIM Takeaway
The market has done what the market often does after a guidance reset: thrown out the higher quality part of the business along with the lower quality part. Gentrack’s recurring revenue is accelerating, the installed base is contributing strongly, two large pipeline slippages were largely outside management control, the balance sheet is intact, and capital allocation looks deliberately countercyclical with two strategic acquisitions and a buyback.
The risks are real, particularly around the CEO sale, pipeline conversion and continued competitive pressure in the retail energy market. But the gap between a 10% plus recurring revenue grower with a clean balance sheet and a software business that is genuinely broken is the gap long term investors are usually paid to think about carefully.
The next 6-12 months will tell us a great deal. The current price is, in my view, pricing in the worst version of the story.
Disclaimer: Gentrack Group (ASX: GTK) is held in TAMIM portfolios as at the date of article publication. Holdings can change substantially at any time.
This week’s reading list explores a defining feature of modern markets: progress rarely moves in a straight line. Across investing, inflation, AI, and the future of work, the common thread is that innovation and opportunity are increasingly arriving alongside greater complexity, sharper competition, and changing expectations. From private equity’s evolving role in building consumer brands to the IPO momentum behind next-generation AI infrastructure, capital continues to flow toward transformation even as markets grapple with inflation shocks and uneven sentiment. At the same time, headlines around leadership, governance, and technology remind investors that disruption is as much about people and power as it is about products. In workplaces, AI is not simply creating efficiency; it is reshaping how work is structured, measured, and intensified. Together, these pieces highlight an environment where economic resilience, strategic adaptability, and disciplined thinking matter more than ever. For investors and business leaders alike, understanding the intersection of markets, innovation, and human behaviour remains essential to navigating what comes next.
